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Abstract: The purpose of our research was to assess how knowledgeable US 
Department of Defense (DoD) contracting officers are regarding procurement 
internal controls and what perceptions they have concerning their 
organisations’ susceptibility to procurement fraud. In this empirical study, we 
developed a web-based survey designed to assess the DoD procurement 
workforce’s knowledge of procurement internal controls as well as their 
perceptions of organisational internal controls. Based on our findings, we 
concluded that agencies may be lacking auditability in their organisations, and 
we provided recommendations to DoD on improving procurement internal 
controls to help reduce its vulnerability to procurement fraud as well as ensure 
auditability in their organisations. As defence organisations, as well as 
international public procurement agencies, continue to strive for accountability, 
integrity, and transparency in their procurement operations, auditability will 
continue to increase in importance. 
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1 Introduction 
The US Federal Government obligated over $411 billion in contracts for supplies and 
services in fiscal year (FY) 2013 (USA Spending, 2013). Within the federal government, 
the Department of Defense (DoD) is the largest contracting agency, obligating 
approximately $258 billion during the same FY (USA Spending, 2013). Yet, given the 
significant dollar value of awarded contracts and the importance of the procurement 
function, the DoD procurement process continues to be plagued by deficiencies in 
procurement planning, administration, and oversight (DoDIG, 2009, 2012). The 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the DoD Inspector General (DoDIG) have 
consistently reported on DoDs contracting deficiencies. For example, between 2001 and 
2009, the GAO issued 16 reports related to trends, challenges, and deficiencies in defence 
contracting. During that same time period, the DoD IG issued 142 reports on deficiencies 
in the DoD acquisition and contract administration processes (DoDIG, 2009). 
The DoD procurement workforce professionals are responsible for managing millions 
of contract actions for the procurement of critical supplies and services, ranging from 
commercial-type supplies, professional and administrative services, highly complex 
information technology systems, and major defence weapon systems (Federal 
Procurement Data System-Next Generation, 2013). The DoDs reliance on its 
procurement organisations for these critical supplies, systems, and services necessitates 
that its procurement function be managed with integrity, accountability, and transparency 
(Thai, 2004; Cohen and Eimicke, 2008; GAO, 2011). The essence of DoDs procurement 
function is the proper planning, award, and administration of contracts and the oversight 
of contractor performance (Rendon and Snider, 2008). However, the GAO and the 
DoDIG have identified deficiencies in the procurement planning, contract award, and 
contractor surveillance processes. The GAO has identified DoD contract management as 
a ‘high-risk’ area since 1992 (GAO, 2013a) reflecting the DoDs challenges in achieving 
desired outcomes in terms of meeting procurement cost, schedule, and performance 
objectives. This designation also reflects that DOD risks not obtaining best value in its 
procurement of supplies and services as well as not achieving its public policy objectives. 
Many of these procurement deficiencies are the result of material internal control 
weaknesses in the procurement processes (DoDIG, 2009). GAO and DoDIG reports have 
indicated an ever increasing concern about weak internal controls within DoDs 
acquisition agencies (GAO, 2006; DoDIG, 2009). Furthermore, these procurement 
process deficiencies and internal control weaknesses have resulted in incidents of 
procurement fraud within DoD and throughout the defence supply chain. Examples of 
these procurement fraud incidents include suppliers providing inferior parts, overcharging 
for parts or services, and exporting technology to non-approved countries or 
organisations (GAO, 2006; DoDIG, 2012; Gansler, 2011). These types of internal control 
weaknesses increase the government’s risk of jeopardising the value for the public dollars 
spent on supplies and services. 
In response to these internal control weaknesses and resulting procurement process 
deficiencies, the DoD is increasing its emphasis on procurement training and the 
development of procurement workforce competencies (Newell, 2007; DoD, 2007; GAO, 
2002). Although DoD is emphasising procurement training of its workforce, it is not 
placing an equal emphasis on its procurement processes or internal controls. Competent 
procurement personnel are only one facet of the auditability triangle. In addition to 
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competent personnel, auditability encompasses governance aspects such as internal 
controls and organisational processes. Auditability is needed by procurement agencies to 
ensure the integrity, accountability, and transparency of its procurement programs and is 
an organisation’s first line of defence in the battle against procurement fraud. Auditability 
ensures procurement projects are kept on budget and schedule. As stated by the Secretary 
of the Air Force, my “priority is making every dollar count for the taxpayer”….“it means 
auditability as a fundamental principle of our good stewardship” [Department of Defense 
News Service, (2014), p.1]. The DoD needs to be concerned with effective internal 
controls and capable procurement processes to ensure auditability in its procurement 
organisations and to ensure value for money. Therefore, DoD agencies need a competent 
procurement workforce, capable procurement processes, and effective internal controls to 
achieve its procurement goals and objectives. 
Given this backdrop, the purpose of this paper is to explore auditability in DoD 
procurement organisations, focusing on the relationship between DoDs procurement 
processes and organisational internal controls. Specifically, our purpose is to assess how 
knowledgeable DoD contracting officers are regarding procurement internal controls and 
what their perceptions are concerning their organisations’ susceptibility to procurement 
fraud. Applying the concept of auditability, we analyse empirical data obtained from 
surveying the DoD contracting workforce on areas related to procurement processes, 
internal controls, and procurement fraud. We accomplish this by developing a web-based 
survey consisting of knowledge-based questions related to procurement internal controls 
as well as organisation-based questions related to perceptions of internal control 
effectiveness and fraud vulnerability. We deployed the survey to US DoD contracting 
officers. We then analyse the assessment results and make recommendations for 
improving auditability in procurement organisations by emphasising procurement internal 
controls and fraud deterrence. Results from the data analysis will also be used to make 
recommendations for improving contracting workforce competency, procurement process 
capability, and internal control effectiveness. These research findings are then generalised 
to international public procurement agencies. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: we first discuss the relevant 
literature on auditability theory and its application to public procurement management 
and internal control frameworks. Since procurement is typically performed in a project 
management context, our literature review includes a discussion of governance in project 
management as well as in procurement organisations. We also discuss the relationship 
between effective procurement internal controls and an organisation’s vulnerability to 
procurement fraud. Because auditability impacts fraud and corruption, and ensures value 
for money, we also review recent research in deterring public fraud, fighting corruption, 
and ensuring value for money. We then discuss our conceptual framework by introducing 
the auditability triangle and its components of personnel, processes, and internal controls. 
Next, we discuss our research method to include the design of our survey, formulation of 
our survey questions, and selection of survey respondents. Subsequently, we discuss our 
research findings and present our conclusions and implications for international public 
procurement agencies. 
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2 Literature review 
2.1 Auditability 
In his theory on organisations and auditability, Power states that “auditability is a 
condition of possibility of all inspection and auditing practices and also a mode of 
organizational transformation” [Power, (2007), p.14]. This transformation occurs when 
organisations establish data collection practices and systems of documentation to make 
them auditable. This is distinct from conducting actual audits or inspections. The process 
of ‘making things auditable’ requires organisations to establish and actively manage an 
institutionally acceptable knowledge management system supporting its governance of 
processes and practices [Power, (1996), p.289]. It is those “processes by which 
procedures and routines, paradigms of auditability, become institutionalized as the public 
face of practice” [Power, (1996), p.312]. Power (2007) further states that the recent 
increased concern for risk management has resulted in an accompanying argument in 
support for the auditability of internal controls. He also states that an auditable 
organisation is an organisation for whom the evidence of the integrity of control 
processes is readily available (2007, p.12). 
Weigand et al. (2013) introduce a four-level auditability framework, with each level 
adding to the organisation’s degree of self-knowledge and control. Level 1 reflects an 
operational process focus and is based on events and transactions. Level 2 reflects an 
accounts focus and is based on system-based auditing. Both level 1 and level 2 use  
self-reporting as the primary source of the audit statement. Level 3 reflects an operational 
policy focus and is based on auditing to check if all of the organisation’s controls are in 
place. Finally, level 4 reflects a management process focus and is based on auditing or 
checking to see if the manager is in control, that is, whether the management responds 
when things go wrong. Both level 3 and level 4 use accounting information systems as 
the primary source of the audit statement. 
Weigand et al.’s four-level auditability framework reflects the differences in 
organisational capability in terms of self-knowledge and control. The framework’s shift 
from level 1 to level 2 reflects a move from events and transactions to accounts, as well 
as “viewing the performance of the auditee in isolation to viewing it as part of a system, a 
cooperative network of actors, each with his own interests” [Weigand, et al., (2013), p.7]. 
The shift from level 2 to level 3 reflects a move from the organisation being retroactive to 
becoming “more explicit about its norms and more aware of the risk” and thus “efforts 
get more directed towards prevention” [Weigand, et al., (2013), p.7] and, therefore, is 
based more on risk-based audits. The shift from level 3 to level 4 reflects a reinforced 
“responsibility of the manager in coping with a dynamic environment and optimizing 
business value” and also reflects the organisational culture evolving “into a learning and 
adaptive organization” [Weigand, et al., (2013), p.7]. 
2.2 Project governance 
Auditability also reflects an organisation’s governance structure and that structure’s 
management of procurement activities. As more and more organisations adopt a project 
management approach to managing procurement activities (Dinsmore, 1998; Kerzner, 
2013; Fleming, 2003), the organisation’s governance structure and the structure’s impact 
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on project success have been evolving research topics in the project management 
literature. Frame (1999) stresses the importance of competent personnel and competent 
organisations (in terms of procedures and processes) for ensuring the success of an 
organisation’s projects. Rollins and Lanza (2005) discuss the need for a solid corporate 
governance structure as well as a renewed emphasis on strong internal controls as a 
response to the increase in project fraud incidents. Crawford et al. (2008, p.S43) 
identified an increased focus on corporate governance resulting from “numerous high-
profile corporate collapses which have highlighted the need for accountability, 
transparency, and the ability to implement strategy”. Crawford and Helm (2009) also 
discussed governance in public sector organisations and the role projects play in ensuring 
accountability, transparency, control, compliance, risk management, consistency in 
delivery, value for money, and stakeholder engagement. 
2.3 Internal controls, processes, and personnel 
Although procurement is increasingly becoming a critical aspect of project management 
(Macbeth et al., 2012; Hong and Kwon, 2012), there is limited literature on auditability in 
public procurement organisations. However, some research has focused on various 
aspects of auditability, such as internal controls, capable procurement processes, and 
personnel competency. For example, Rendon (2012) identified differences in perceptions 
of internal control effectiveness between cardholders and approving officials in the US 
DoD government purchase card program. Additionally, assessments of DoDs contracting 
process capability within Navy, Air Force, and Army procurement agencies have 
consistently identified the source selection process as more capable, and contract 
administration and contract closeout as less capable processes across the DoD (Rendon, 
2008). Finally, research on DoDs acquisition workforce competence has also been 
undertaken, specifically looking at the impact of the implementation of the Defense 
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA). Snider (1996) suggests that the 
result of professionalisation of the acquisition workforce has led to an acquisition 
workforce that is expert and specialised in its specific functional area (e.g., contracting), 
yet insular and careerist (Snider, 1996). Rendon (2010) concludes that as defence 
acquisition management continues to encounter problems in meeting cost, schedule, and 
performance objectives, the defence acquisition system will continue to be reformed, and 
the defence acquisition workforce will need to continue to reflect the changing 
knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to manage defence acquisition programs. 
2.4 Deterring fraud and corruption 
The literature also reflects research on international public procurement and public 
governance, especially in the areas of deterring fraud and corruption, as well as the 
challenge of ensuring value for money. For example, Basheka and Bisangabasaija (2010) 
explore the relationship between institutional framework and management systems with 
unethical procurement behaviour. Although their findings do not show a very strong 
relationship, they did find that communication and monitoring and evaluation have a 
statistically significant correlation with unethical procurement behaviour. Additionally, 
Basheka et al. (2013) conducted survey-based research on procurement corruption and  
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found that the manifestation of procurement corruption included disregard for 
procurement procedures in contract award, high procurement expenditure yet low service, 
and a misuse of public resources. Furthermore, their case study research found that 
procurement corruption in the local government resulted in “poor infrastructure 
especially roads, shortage of school facilities, government lack of capacity for monitoring 
decentralized units, and illicit enrichment of public officers” [Basheka et al., (2013), 
p.696]. Basheka’s (2009a) empirical research on corruption and services acquisition 
discussed perceived forms of public procurement corruption and implications on effective 
service delivery. 
Osei-Tutu et al. (2010) explored corruption practices inherent in public procurement 
of infrastructural projects in Ghana in order to identify corruption related challenges. 
Their findings identified “conflict of interest, bribery, embezzlement, kickbacks, tender 
manipulation and fraud” in Ghana’s infrastructure delivery systems (p.236). Their 
research found that “sound procurement systems and pro-social equity policies that 
would foster good governance, corporate social responsibility, transparency, 
accountability and judicious public expenditure” will control corruption practices (p.236). 
Nesti’s (2014) analysis of the 2010 Agreement for the Mutual Enforcement of 
Debarment Decisions signed by the World Bank and the main regional Multilateral 
Development Banks (MDBs) identified several challenges to ensuring integrity in public 
procurement activities including “a fair and effective sanction system is not only 
instrumental in providing a strong deterrent against fraud and corruption, but can also be 
helpful for prevention purposes” (pp.77–78). Sorte’s (2013, p.72) research on centralised 
procurement in the Brazilian information and communications technology sector 
concluded that “since centralized government tenders involve significant financial 
resources, it is essential to insulate the procurement unit from private interests and 
political pressure”. 
In research related to ensuring value for money, Eadie et al. (2013) identified the 
importance of proper procurement strategies in ensuring value for money in UK 
construction projects. Their research findings suggest that procurement processes should 
be more robust and adopt procurement methods based on potential for best value for 
money. Schiele’s (2007) research on the role of public purchasing departments in the 
acquisition of consulting services discusses the type of value that can be associated with 
meaningful involvement and the problem resulting from the purchasing department’s low 
involvement in such acquisitions. Basheka’s (2009b) research on public procurement in 
Uganda found a significant positive relationship between procurement planning and local 
governance, suggesting government procurement projects require sufficient planning to 
ensure success and value for money. 
3 Conceptual framework 
As can be seen in the above literature review, the theory of auditability incorporates 
aspects of governance which emphasises effective internal controls, capable processes, 
and competent personnel. This relationship can be seen in Figure 1 which presents the 
conceptual framework we use in our research. 
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Figure 1 Auditability triangle 
 
The personnel aspect of organisational auditability refers to the competence of personnel 
performing procurement functions in the organisation. This includes program managers, 
contracting officers, finance managers, technical managers, and other members of the 
procurement project team (Rendon and Snider, 2008). Personnel competence includes the 
necessary education, training, and experience requirements for each functional area (i.e., 
career field) of the project team members. For the US DoD procurement workforce, 
personnel competence requirements are established by the DAWIA (DoD, 2007). 
The processes aspect of auditability refers to the capability of organisational 
processes for performing procurement-related activities. Procurement activities are 
typically discussed in terms of the phases of the procurement lifecycle, which include 
procurement planning, solicitation, source selection, contract administration, and contract 
closeout (Rendon and Snider, 2008). Process capability is measured in terms of processes 
that are fully-established, institutionalised, mandated, integrated with other organisational 
processes, periodically measured, and continuously improved (Rendon, 2008). The 
importance of capable procurement processes is reflected in the procurement 
benchmarking literature. For example, Raymond (2008) suggests that the need for 
measuring public procurement processes is becoming more intense, especially as the 
demand for transparency and accountability in the public sector is increasing. Hong and 
Kwon (2012) found that measuring procurement processes and outcomes is an essential 
step since procurement impacts financial performance. 
The internal controls aspect, in relation to auditability in organisations, refers to the 
objective of enforcing internal control policies to ensure compliance with laws and 
regulations, monitoring procedures to assess enforcement, and reporting material 
weaknesses. Internal control is typically discussed in terms of the five internal control 
components established by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO). In COSO (2013), published the Internal Control Integrated 
Framework, which updated the previous 1992 original framework to include 17 
principles associated with each of the five internal control components. 
These internal control components have been adopted by the US Federal Government 
(GAO, 1999) as well as reflected in the DoDs internal control procedures (Department of 
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Defense Instruction 5010.40, 2013). In 1999, the GAO issued the Standards for Internal 
Control in the Federal Government to assist government managers in achieving their 
missions and program results and in improving accountability (GAO, 1999). According 
to the GAO, internal control activities, such as verifications, reconciliations, 
authorisations, segregation of duties, and appropriate documentation, are important to 
help ensure that management’s directives are achieved (GAO, 1999). GAO is currently in 
the process of updating the standards for internal controls in the federal government to 
incorporate the new COSO principles (GAO, 2013b). 
The five components of the COSO internal control framework include control 
environment, risk assessment, information and communication, control activities, and 
monitoring activities. The control environment, which sets the tone of an organisation 
and is considered the foundational component, comprises management’s commitment to 
ethical values, management’s integrity, personnel policies, and organisational structure. 
Risk assessment, which involves evaluating the risks that could pose a threat to the 
organisation’s ability to achieve its goals, includes finding ways of mitigating the 
identified risks as well as assessing fraud risk. Information and communication, which 
encompasses the accounting information system as well as appropriate internal and 
external communications, calls for accountability, integrity, and transparency throughout 
the organisation. Control activities, which include the policies and procedures established 
by the organisation to help ensure that management’s directives to mitigate risks 
identified in risk assessment are enforced, entail such things as performance reviews, 
physical controls, technology controls, and segregation of duties. Monitoring activities, 
which is the process of assessing the quality of internal controls over time to make sure 
that the organisation’s goals and objectives are being met, entail making modifications or 
changes to control activities or procedures when warranted and feasible. These five 
components and associated principles, as shown in Appendix, are integrated with one 
another and serve as the foundation of an internal control system (COSO, 2013). 
Past research has shown that internal control weaknesses break down the efficiency of 
controls over public procurement, which could contribute to fraudulent activities within 
the organisation. In a case study on non-profit organisations addressing risk management 
and accountability, Spillan and Ziemnowicz (2011) identified common threads which 
included manipulation of public money to achieve private gain and benefits, lack of 
ethical standards, lack of internal controls, and lack of proper oversight by leadership. 
Their research demonstrated that non-profit organisations need to take actions to 
encourage accountability and ensure internal controls are properly implemented. Thus, 
weak internal controls, poor leadership, poor accountability, and lack of transparency 
nurture the opportunity for fraud in organisations. 
Additionally, Hedley and Cohen (2010) noted that in KPMGs 2009 Fraud Survey, 
65% of senior executives cited fraud and misconduct as significant threats within their 
respective industries. They found that risk assessment, when properly implemented, 
could assist organisations in building a process to help avoid losses due to fraud and 
misconduct. Furthermore, Ugrin and Odom (2010) showed that publicising severe 
prosecutions resulting from fraudulent activities could enhance fraud deterrence. Finally, 
Moncada (2005) found that executive directors from non-profit organisations identified 
assessing the adequacy of internal controls as one of the top ten most important issues 
that needed to be addressed in order to accomplish their organisation’s mission and goals. 
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As previously discussed, the US GAO and the DoD IG have identified deficiencies in 
the procurement planning, contract award, and contractor surveillance processes. These 
procurement deficiencies can be traced to material internal control weaknesses (DoDIG, 
2009), and these internal control weaknesses increase the government’s susceptibility for 
procurement fraud throughout the defence supply chain (GAO, 2006; DoDIG, 2012; 
Gansler, 2011). In our previous research on internal controls and procurement fraud, with 
the assistance of our MBA thesis student (Tan, 2013), we conducted a review of 
approximately 20 actual US Federal Government fraud cases. In our analysis of each 
fraud case, we identified weaknesses in specific internal control components that 
contributed to the procurement fraud incident. For example, our analysis revealed that the 
majority of the government organisations in the fraud cases lacked enforcement in control 
environment, control activities, and monitoring activities, which contributed to the 
occurrence of the procurement fraud incidents. In terms of the control environment, the 
organisations lacked a high ethical tone at the top and commitment to develop and 
maintain a competent, professional, and ethical procurement workforce. In terms of 
control activities, the organisations failed to mandate fraud training for procurement 
employees, failed to mandate segregation of duties for procurement employees, and 
failed to set up a ‘checks and balances’ system in key procurement processes. In terms of 
monitoring activities, the organisations lacked effective ongoing and separate internal 
control evaluation procedures [Tan, (2013), p.98]. 
Based on the above literature review, we can conclude that organisational auditability 
in its procurement operations, as reflected in the effectiveness of its procurement internal 
controls, can help reduce its vulnerability to procurement fraud. Thus, organisations need 
to emphasise auditability in its operations, and specifically, in its internal controls. 
Furthermore, the organisation’s contracting officers should be knowledgeable of internal 
controls and how internal control weaknesses can contribute to procurement fraud. This 
is the purpose of our research – to assess how knowledgeable DoD contracting officers 
are regarding procurement internal controls and what perceptions they have concerning 
their organisations’ susceptibility to procurement fraud. The next section will discuss our 
research method, design of our survey, formulation of our survey questions, and selection 
of survey respondents. 
4 Research method 
Due to the exploratory nature of this research, a qualitative case study approach was 
appropriate for our purpose (Creswell, 2003; Yin, 1994). With the assistance of our MBA 
student (Chang, 2013), we developed an assessment tool designed to assess the DoD 
procurement workforce’s knowledge of procurement internal controls as well as their 
perceptions of organisational internal control effectiveness. The assessment tool consisted 
of 26 knowledge-based questions pertaining to contracting processes, internal control 
components, and procurement fraud schemes. These knowledge-based questions were 
developed using sources such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID) 
(n.d.) and the Office of the Inspector General, US General Services Administration 
(GSA), procurement fraud handbook (GSA OIG, 2012). The assessment tool also 
included 12 organisation-based items related to the respondent’s perceptions of internal 
controls within their organisations. These items were designed to determine if any aspects 
of the organisations’ internal structure, processes, or culture made the organisation more 
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susceptible to fraudulent activity. Additionally, these items were also designed to assess 
the respondents’ perceptions of their organisations regarding fraud incidents (Chang, 
2013). The organisation-based items were adopted and modified from the Internal 
Control Survey developed by the New York State Internal Control Association 
(NYSICA, 2006). These organisation-based items used a Likert scale ranging from 
strongly agree (numerical value of 5) to strongly disagree (numerical value of 1). These 
items also allowed responses of ‘I do not know’ and ‘I prefer not to answer’. 
The web-based assessment tool was developed using the online survey-hosting 
service LimeSurvey. The survey link was e-mailed to the contracting workforce and was 
made available for a three-week period. At the end of the period, the results were 
collected and analysed. We used descriptive statistics to identify high-missed questions 
from the knowledge assessment and patterns of differences in responses to the 
organisational perception items. 
The survey respondents were contracting officers assigned to a US Army contracting 
agency. The army contracting agency is responsible for supporting the US Army 
installations by contracting for office supplies, equipment, support services, and minor 
construction. These contracting requirements are typically not well-defined, and 
therefore, are characterised by increased flexibility, interpretation, and vulnerability to 
fraud. In 2012, the Army contracting agency managed over $6.4 billion in contracts using 
a variety of contract mechanisms, ranging from the government purchase card to complex 
services contracts (Chang, 2013). The next section discusses our research findings and 
analyses. 
5 Findings and analyses 
We deployed the survey to the army contracting agency procurement workforce on April 
1, 2013 and closed it on April 26, 2013. Of the approximately 1,350 personnel, which 
consisted of mostly government civilian employees, who were eligible to take the survey, 
99 respondents completed the survey, resulting in a response rate of 7%. Table 1 provides 
the breakout of survey respondents by years of experience. 
Table 1 Number of survey respondents by experience group 
Workforce experience level Number of respondents 
2 years or less 15 
3 to 5 years 21 
6 to 10 years 26 
11 to 20 years 15 
Over 20 years 22 
Total 99 
Source: Chang (2013) 
5.1 Knowledge-based questions 
The assessment tool consisted of 26 knowledge-based questions pertaining to 
organisational internal controls. These questions were used to assess the procurement 
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workforce’s knowledge of internal controls in the procurement process. The questions 
were associated with each of the five components of internal controls (COSO, 2013). 
Table 2 provides the results of the knowledge assessment questions based on the 
associated internal control component and the percent of respondents correctly answering 
that category of questions. Additionally, Table 3 provides the results of the knowledge 
assessment questions based on the average score for each experience group. 
Table 2 Number of knowledge-based questions per internal control component and percent 
correct by respondents 
Internal control component Number of questions Percent correct 
Control activities 6 65.7 
Control environment 3 49.2 
Information and communication 4 46.1 
Monitoring 7 58.2 
Risk assessment 6 69.8 
Average score 26 63.0 
Source: Chang (2013) 
Table 3 Average score by experience group 
Respondent experience level Percent correct 
2 years or less 55.4 
3 to 5 years 58.6 
6 to 10 years 62.7 
11 to 20 years 63.1 
Over 20 years 70.5 
Source: Chang (2013) 
As reflected in Table 2, the results of the knowledge-based questions revealed some 
interesting findings. The questions related to the information and communication internal 
control component had the lowest average score (percent correct) of 46.1%. Additionally, 
the questions related to the risk assessment component had the highest average score of 
69.8%. 
The findings reflected in Table 3 shows a consistency between experience group of 
the respondents and the average score of the assessment. The lower experienced 
respondents had lower average scores than the more experienced respondents. 
5.2 Organisation-based questions 
As previously stated, the assessment tool also included 12 organisation-based items 
designed to determine if any aspects of the organisations’ internal structure, processes, or 
culture made the organisation more susceptible to fraudulent activity and to assess the 
respondents’ perceptions of their organisations upon encountering fraud incidents 
(Chang, 2013). Table 4 provides the results of the organisation-based items reflecting the 
respondents’ mean score for each item. 
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Table 4 Organisation-based item mean scores 
Organisation-based items 
Mean score  
5: strongly agree –  
1: strongly disagree 
My department has clear lines of authority and responsibility. 4.15 
My department is regularly reviewed by internal or external 
auditors. 
3.94 
I would report fraudulent or suspicious activity if I saw or 
suspected it. 
4.77 
I have a clear way of reporting fraudulent or suspicious activity 
within my organisation outside of my immediate supervisor. 
4.23 
I know who to report to if I saw or suspected fraudulent activities. 4.31 
I have adequate knowledge of contracting fraud schemes to 
perform my duties. 
3.90 
Instances of reported suspected fraudulent or suspicious activity 
have been adequately investigated by my organisation. 
3.84 
Employees in my organisation who are found to have participated 
in fraudulent activities will be subject to appropriate 
consequences. 
4.08 
My organisation places sufficient emphasis on the importance of 
integrity, ethical conduct, fairness, and honesty in their dealings 
with employees, vendors, and other organisations. 
4.34 
Source: Chang (2013) and NYSICA (2006) 
As reflected in Table 4, the responses to the organisation-based items ranged from 3.84 to 
4.77 (based on a Likert scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The average 
response to all nine items was 4.17. The item that received the highest mean score 
(respondents most agreed with) was the item ‘I would report fraudulent or suspicious 
activity if I saw or suspected it’ with a mean score of 4.77. Only one respondent 
answered ‘I do not know’. 
Additionally, the item that received the lowest mean score (respondents least agreed 
with) was the item “Instances of reported suspected fraudulent or suspicious activity have 
been adequately investigated by my organization” with a mean score of 3.84. It should be 
noted that even though this could be considered a relatively high score, this item also 
received 37 ‘I do not know’ responses. 
The organisation-based items also included a question that asked the respondents 
‘Which internal control component is suspected to be the most vulnerable for fraudulent 
activity in your organisation?’ The respondents were provided with a short description of 
each of the five internal control components. As reflected in Table 5, the information and 
communication component received 13% of the responses. Even more notable was that 
17% of the respondents selected ‘I do not know’ while 38% of the respondents selected ‘I 
do not suspect fraud’. 
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Table 5 Internal control perception 
Which internal control component is suspected to be the most vulnerable for fraudulent activity 
in your organisation? 
Control environment 4% 
Control activities 12% 
Information and communication 13% 
Monitoring 5% 
Risk assessment 8% 
I prefer not to answer 2% 
I do not know 17% 
I do not suspect fraud 38% 
Source: Chang (2013) 
Finally, the organisation-based items included a question that asked the respondents ‘To 
which procurement fraud scheme is your organisation most susceptible?’ As reflected in 
Table 6, the conflict of interest fraud scheme received 13% of the responses, and 
collusion received 10% of the responses. Even more notable was that 13% of the 
respondents selected ‘I do not know’ while 53% of the respondents selected ‘I do not 
suspect fraud’. 
Table 6 Fraud scheme perception 




Conflict of interest 13% 
Fraudulent purchases 2%
Fraudulent representation 0% 
I prefer not to answer 2% 
I do not know 13% 
I do not suspect fraud 53% 
Source: Chang (2013) 
6 Discussion 
The results of the knowledge-based questions suggest that there is some variance in the 
knowledge level of internal controls among the surveyed contracting workforce. The 
difference in knowledge levels is displayed in the varying scores received for the 
questions related to each of the internal control components. As shown in Table 2, risk 
assessment received the highest score with 69.8%, and information and communications 
received the lowest score with 46.1%. The overall average score of these knowledge 
questions was 63% (Table 2). Using traditional college grading protocol, these 
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contracting officers would receive grades of D or lower for this assessment. Although the 
contracting officers scored an average of 63% on the internal control knowledge 
assessment, their average response to the organisation-based item ‘I have adequate 
knowledge of contracting fraud schemes to perform my duties’ was 3.9 (approximately at 
the agree level) (Table 4). This finding, along with the finding previously discussed, 
suggests that perhaps the contracting officers are overly-optimistic in assessing their 
knowledge of procurement internal controls. 
The results of the internal control and fraud scheme perception questions revealed 
that there may be a disconnect between procurement internal control knowledge (as 
reflected in Table 2) and perceptions of internal controls and fraud schemes (Tables 5 and 
6). As reflected in Tables 5 and 6, 38% of respondents answered ‘I do not suspect fraud’ 
as related to internal controls and 53% responded ‘I do not suspect fraud’ as related to 
fraud scheme susceptibility. These findings indicate that the majority of the surveyed 
contracting officers do not suspect fraud in their organisations, yet the results of the 
knowledge assessment (Table 2) show that these contracting officers have a limited 
knowledge level of internal controls related to procurement fraud. These findings also 
indicate that perhaps the contracting officers’ limited knowledge of internal controls 
(internal controls which, if not effective, may contribute to fraud incidents) may reveal 
that the organisation could in fact be vulnerable to some form of procurement fraud. 
It is also interesting to note that the internal control component information and 
communication was the area with the lowest knowledge assessment score (Table 2) as 
well as the organisation’s internal control component chosen as the most vulnerable to 
fraud (Table 5). This may indicate that perhaps the surveyed contracting officers’ low 
knowledge level of this specific internal control component is resulting in their 
perception of their organisations having a higher risk for procurement fraud in the 
internal control component information and Communication. 
In summarising our research results, we found that perhaps the surveyed contracting 
officers are overly-optimistic in self-assessing their knowledge of procurement internal 
controls. Additionally, this over-optimism in their knowledge of procurement internal 
controls may result in organisations being vulnerable to some form of procurement fraud. 
Finally, the surveyed contracting officers’ low knowledge level of the Information and 
Communication internal control component may be resulting in their perception of this 
internal control component being the most susceptible to fraud in their organisations. 
These research findings can be used to identify possible recommendations for the 
assessed organisation. The research findings indicated that the information and 
communication internal control component was not only the component with the lowest 
score on the knowledge assessment but also the component selected as most susceptible 
to procurement fraud. This internal control component includes internal and external 
communications, transparency, and knowledge of the appropriate standards of conduct. 
The organisation’s accounting system, along with recordkeeping and documentary 
policies are also part of information and communication. To strengthen this internal 
control component, this assessed agency should ensure that personnel have a means to 
report suspected fraudulent activity to outside entities or internally independent of their 
chain of command. Public procurement personnel should be periodically reminded of the 
proper standards of conduct required of those in performing procurement activities. 
Additionally, contractors and potential contractors should also be informed of the public 
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procurement standards of conduct so they, too, can identify and report any fraudulent 
activity. 
Additionally, our findings indicated that the collusion and conflict of Interest fraud 
schemes were selected by the respondents as the top two fraud schemes to which their 
organisation is most susceptible (Table 6). This agency should strengthen its internal 
controls to guard against these fraud schemes. This may include ensuring, enhancing, or 
supplementing personnel disclosure requirements for all members of the procurement 
project team, not just the contracting officers or the source selection team. These research 
results also provide some implications for the international public procurement 
community, which will be discussed next. 
7 Implications for international public procurement 
Public procurement agencies are charged with ensuring that their contracts are satisfying 
customers’ needs in terms of value for money and that their procurement activities are 
conducted with the highest levels of integrity, accountability, and transparency. Agencies 
need competent personnel, capable procurement processes, and effective internal 
controls, i.e., auditability, in performing their procurement duties and achieving their 
procurement mission. 
Our research findings suggest that agencies are not emphasising procurement internal 
controls in their workforce competencies, which may be contributing to an increased 
vulnerability for procurement fraud. Public agencies are challenged with reliance on the 
procurement function for accomplishing their missions, while striving for increased 
levels of integrity, accountability, and transparency. In pursuing auditability in its 
procurement operations, agencies should incorporate training on internal controls and 
fraud awareness in its procurement competencies. This training should include an 
understanding of internal control components and how they should be implemented in 
each procurement process area. More importantly, the procurement workforce should 
understand the relationship between ineffective internal control components and the 
resulting fraud vulnerabilities within each procurement process area. A proposed 
framework for this needed training area is shown in Figure 2. 
In addition to incorporating training on internal controls and fraud awareness, 
agencies should also focus on ensuring capable contracting processes in its organisations. 
Procurement processes should be documented, well-established, and integrated 
throughout the agency as well as continuously measured and improved. Finally, agencies 
should ensure that procurement internal controls are effective in deterring and identifying 
procurement fraud incidents. This includes implementing an internal control management 
program overseeing internal control policies to ensure compliance with laws and 
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Figure 2 Procurement fraud matrix 
 
Several initiatives by international organisations have been implemented focusing on 
integrity, accountability, and transparency in public procurement. For example, 
Transparency International (TI) has created international anti-corruption conventions as 
well as instituted Integrity Pacts for preventing corruption in public contracting. These 
pacts are agreements between the government agency offering a contract and the 
companies bidding for it that they will abstain from bribery, collusion, and other corrupt 
practices for the extent of the contract. To ensure accountability, integrity pacts also 
include a monitoring system typically led by civil society groups (Transparency 
International, 2014). TI has also partnered with North Atlantic Treaty Organizations 
(NATO) nations in developing an integrity self-assessment process for defence and 
security. This self-assessment includes assessing the strength of their integrity systems in 
areas such as anti-corruption laws and policies and procurement as well as engaging with 
defence companies (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, 
2010). 
Additionally, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
(DCAF), a global leading institution in the areas of security sector reform and 
governance, has developed a compendium of best practices for building integrity and 
reducing corruption in defence (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed 
Forces, 2010). DCAF identified process capability as well as process integrity as key for 
reducing the potential for procurement-related corruption. DCAF also identified clear 
delineation of required competencies, decision-making authority, and oversight 
responsibilities as essential for ensuring integrity in organisations (Geneva Centre for the 
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Furthermore, NATO, under the sponsorship of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 
(EAPC), sponsors the Building Integrity Initiative which “seeks to raise awareness, 
promote good practice, and provide practical tools to help nations build integrity and 
reduce risks of corruption in the security sector by strengthening transparency and 
accountability” [NATO Conference Report, (2011), p.3]. During the most recent NATO 
Building Integrity Conference, discussions among NATO member countries and partner 
nations focused on identifying anti-corruption education and training needs, the value of 
assessing and improving procurement processes, and the necessity for preventive 
controls, detection, and prosecution [NATO Conference Report, (2011), pp.9–30]. 
Finally, in the 2012 Global Fraud Study, the Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners (ACFE) found that “corruption and billing schemes pose the greatest risks to 
organizations throughout the world. For all geographic regions, these two scheme types 
comprised more than 50% of the frauds reported to us” [ACFE, (2012), p.4]. As can be 
seen from these initiatives, the concepts of auditability in international public 
procurement agencies is gaining much attention and partnering countries are encouraged 
to contribute to the fight against corruption and fraud. 
8 Conclusions 
The US DoD obligates billions of dollars in the procurement of mission-critical supplies 
and services. Yet, given the significant dollar value of these contracts and the importance 
of the procurement function, DoD is plagued with less-than capable contracting processes 
and weak internal controls. These deficiencies increase the DoDs vulnerability for 
procurement fraud. Auditability theory states that organisations should have competent 
people, capable processes, and effective internal controls to deter procurement fraud and 
ensure value for money. Past research shows the relationships between institutional 
frameworks, processes, and controls in deterring fraud and corruption. 
Our research focused on assessing how knowledgeable US DoD contracting officers 
are regarding procurement internal controls and what perceptions they have concerning 
their organisations’ susceptibility to procurement fraud. Our analysis of survey responses 
found that perhaps contracting officers are overly-optimistic in self-assessing their 
knowledge of procurement internal controls, and that this optimism may result in their 
organisations becoming vulnerable to some form of procurement fraud. We also found 
that organisations may not be emphasising internal controls in their procurement 
processes and procedures. 
Based on these findings, we can conclude that agencies may be lacking auditability in 
their organisations, and we provide recommendations to the DoD for improving 
procurement internal controls to help reduce its vulnerability to procurement fraud. As 
public procurement agencies continue to strive for accountability, integrity, and 
transparency in their procurement operations, auditability will continue to increase in 
importance. Our research findings can guide public procurement agencies in ensuring 
they have competent people, effective internal controls, and capable processes, i.e., 
auditability, in their organisations. The use of the Auditability Triangle along with 
Weigand et al.’s four-level auditability framework and the procurement fraud matrix 
provides agencies with some conceptual frameworks to aid in establishing and increasing 
auditability in their agencies. 
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Appendix 
Figure A1 COSOs internal control components and fundamental principles (see online version  
for colours) 
 
Source: Adapted from COSO (2013) and Tan (2013) 
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